Alan:
For Foucault disjuntion is not a logical operation, as far as I can see.
He writes about the failure of 'common' phenomenology and is trying to
discuss how experience can be constituted after that. Disjunction is about
exploring the field of non-relationship between different matters. The
space between seems to be the space of experience and its impossibility to
be represented. To have any experience, to experience things is to experience
disjunction because in any experience you are captured between maximun
proxymity and the impossibility of representing what you have 'vivenciado'
('vivenciar' is a verb in Portuguese that the art critic Guy Brett proposed to
translate as 'to experience'). So for F. to be attentive to the experience
of disjuntion is to follow the only way of being in a productive and creative
position before the possibility of inventing narratives and forms of thinking.
I don't know about Quine and about exclusive or inclusive disjunction.
Lewin's field theory is quite complex and keeps many fundamental differences
from Foucault's thought, who was worried about production of subjectivity but
not about psychology. But both (Foucault and Lewin) used topology as part
of their way of thinking and this is not unimportant: it reveals an use of
mental spaces, of complex spatial figures for developing their way of
thinking and to relate subjects to environment (any kind).
Heterotopic spaces are not transgressive spaces, this possibility does not
exist in F, who talks about ruptures and interstices.
If there is logic there it should be of another kind.
Ricardo Basbaum